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Old Europe, New Europe, Eastern Europe: 
Reflections on a Minor Character in Fassbinder’s 
Ali, Fear Eats the Soul
Anca Parvulescu
In today’s europe, the term eurosceptic often accompanies accusa-tions of retrograde nationalism, irrational feelings, even fanaticism. When applied to Europe, skepticism, one of the critic’s formative 
traits, acquires a bad reputation, as if it can only be an annihilating, 
rather than constructive, form of doubt. And yet skepticism is a much-
needed critical affect, particularly when it comes to Europe. If we need 
to be skeptical of anything, it is Europe. Today one hears claims about 
Europe having become postnational, postracial, even post-Europe. How 
else can the literary and cultural critic welcome such claims other than 
with a healthy dose of skepticism?1
This essay is skeptical of Europe—the very idea that Europe is one. 
We speak of Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Central Europe, Northern 
Europe, Southern Europe, Northwestern Europe, Southeastern Europe. 
Among these various Europes, each with its own cultural geography 
and historical baggage, what we continue to call “Western Europe” and 
“Eastern Europe” stand out in their apparent obdurate endurance. Their 
perseverance in time is due, at least in part, to their co-constitutive force. 
Western Europe has come to stand for Europe and the West through its 
historical distantiation from Eastern Europe.2 In the last decades, in an 
effort to create “European identity,” the institutions of the European 
Union worked to render the distinction between Western and Eastern 
Europe less sharp, but in many ways they exacerbated it. The Schengen 
Agreement walls off a EU Europe from a non-EU Europe, once again 
separating what is simply called Europe from a reconfigured Eastern 
Europe. The latter has reemerged in its post-Cold War configuration in 
the ongoing debates on European migration. Although they, too, are 
theoretically European, certain Eastern Europeans (typically migrant 
workers coming from countries like Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Serbia, 
Moldova, Ukraine) are considered immigrants in Europe. This means 
that, by definition, Eastern Europeans come from somewhere else, some-
where other than Europe. They are immigrants, because, as the OED 
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definition of immigrant reminds us, they intend to “settle” in a country 
other than their “own.”3 Similarly, debates about the Eastern European 
“post-Communist diaspora” suggest that when Eastern Europeans are 
“scattered” throughout Europe they are away from their “homeland.”4
How are we to understand this irony? 
Theories of Europeanization often clash with theories of postcolo-
niality. This is a clash from which the student of East-West relations in 
contemporary Europe has a lot to learn. The countries that are thought 
to make up Western Europe have a history as colonial powers, while 
the countries considered to belong to Eastern Europe have a history as 
colonial subjects. This history carries into the present and translates into 
hierarchies and stratifications along the lines of “modernization” and 
“structural adjustment.” Many Eastern Europeans thus find themselves 
on the unenviable side of the international division of labor and its at-
tendant forms of mobility. But if the international division of labor is 
the contemporary avatar of colonial history, when it comes to Eastern 
Europe the task is to trace its colonial histories keeping in mind that it 
is not only the Western European colonial past that places certain East-
ern Europeans on the weak side of the international division of labor.5
Postcolonial modernities produced by Russian, Ottoman, and Austro-
Hungarian colonial projects still await their mapping onto the realities 
of contemporary global neoliberalism. Finally, the “post-Communist 
condition,” the outcome of half a century of Soviet hegemony (hetero-
geneously distributed across the “Eastern European bloc”), is the most 
important recent factor that determines Eastern Europe’s relation to 
Western Europe. Post-Communism is difficult to grapple with, because 
of its double historical genealogy as a specific form of postcolonialism 
emancipated from Soviet and Russian domination and a legacy inherited 
from the history of the European left and its internationalist ambitions. 
Having borrowed its skepticism vis-à-vis Europe from postcolonial 
theory, this essay focuses on the figure of the subproletarian Eastern 
European female migrant in contemporary Europe. I reread a film that 
has been highly influential in framing the cultural debate on European 
migration: Rainer Werner Fassbinder’s Angst essen Seele auf. The film was 
made over a few weeks in 1973, on a small budget, and received interna-
tional acclaim at the Cannes Film Festival in 1974. Its title, a rendition 
of the main character’s accented German, which in a literal translation 
would read Fear Eat Soul, became Ali, Fear Eats the Soul in English and Tous 
les autres s’appellent Ali in French (the latter a variation on Fassbinder’s 
initial working title: Alle Türken heissen Ali [All Turks Are Called Ali]). 
Ali has acquired cult status in cinephile circles in the last forty years. 
It has also been a “useful” film, having consequentially dramatized ques-
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tions of migration, labor, gender, and racialization in postwar Germany 
and, to some extent, Europe.6 This essay starts from the premise that, 
forty years after its release, the film acquires new meanings in the current 
European configuration. At the same time, a close reading of the film 
shows that Europe retains some of its 1970s attributes when it comes to 
the nexus of migration, labor, gender, and racialization. Although the 
film focused on the Gastarbeiter (“guest worker”) figure in Germany of 
the 1970s, generically and mistakenly considered to be Turkish, my read-
ing shows that the question of Eastern European migration to Western 
Europe was already raised, albeit marginally, by Fassbinder’s 1973 text. 
Perhaps the time has come to move Herzegovinian Yolanda, a minor 
character in Fassbinder’s film, to the forefront of contemporary debates 
on European migration and post-1989 East-West European “unification.” 
In the second part of the essay, I juxtapose my reading of Fassbinder’s 
film to two texts on Europe that are particularly relevant to literary and 
cultural critics: the letter Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida cosigned 
in 2003 in response to the American-led war in Iraq; and Derrida’s 1990 
essay, “The Other Heading.” Drawing out these two texts’ imaginings 
of Europe in relation to Eastern Europe, I aim to show that, following 
1989 and European “unification,” they reconfigure the relation between 
the continent’s two poles, but they by no means erase it. 
A Minor Character
In Fassbinder’s film, Ali is what Germans oxymoronically call a “guest 
worker.” In the 1960s, guest workers came to the Federal Republic of 
Germany at the invitation of its government, which was trying to meet its 
booming economy’s demands for cheap labor. They arrived from Italy, 
Spain, Greece, Portugal, Yugoslavia, and Turkey. By 1973, the number 
of Turkish guest workers had surpassed that of workers coming from 
other countries, and “guest worker” became associated with “Turkish.”7
Guest workers, especially when figured as Turkish, were the first “immi-
grants” to postwar Germany. The encounter with them tested Germans’ 
racial and ethnic perceptions of others, revealing a continuum between 
historical fascism and postwar “everyday fascism.”8 
Fassbinder’s film acquired documentary resonances when it made 
clear that in 1970s Germany, in the eyes of the German working class, 
Ali, who came from Morocco, could unproblematically be considered 
to be Moroccan, Turkish, Arab, and Negro. In the film, Ali, who is in 
his thirties, marries Emmi, an older German cleaning lady, and the 
film revolves around Emmi’s slow realization that her relationship with 
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a “Negro” necessarily triggers her ostracism within her working-class 
German community. This is Fassbinder’s way of rewriting Douglas Sirk’s 
All That Heaven Allows (1955) in a European key. The film ends with the 
two reuniting around the sentence “Together we are strong,” followed 
by Ali’s collapse from a stress-related ulcer. 
There is, however, another “guest” in Fassbinder’s film, who most 
often goes unnoticed. She is a minor character named Yolanda. She ap-
pears at a turning point in the film: Emmi’s coworkers turn their back 
on her once they find out about her marriage to Ali. In a memorable 
Fassbinder-signature scene, we see Emmi eating her lunch alone (fig. 1). 
In the second part of the film, Emmi shows Ali his place (“You should 
get used to the way things are done in Germany”), and her coworkers 
integrate her back into the group. This is when Yolanda makes her 
very brief appearance in the film. She is newly hired and a foreigner 
from Yugoslavia and the group of German cleaning ladies, who have 
just welcomed Emmi back in their midst, immediately exclude Yolanda. 
She is left eating her lunch alone. Fassbinder makes sure the two lunch 
scenes are structurally identical. Looking at the camera from behind the 
bars of her imprisoning isolation, Yolanda takes Emmi’s place. She is, 
structurally, in Emmi’s shoes (fig. 2). She remains in this situation for 
the rest of the film and, as far as Fassbinder’s viewer is concerned, in 
the extended temporality of spectatorship. 
The main character of Fassbinder’s film is Emmi, played by well-known 
German actress Brigitte Mira. In her world, Emmi is abject on account 
of her job and her age. Early in Fassbinder’s film, Emmi reluctantly tells 
Ali about domestic work and its attendant forms of exclusion. It is hard 
being a cleaning lady. No one talks to you, no one seems to notice you. 
Emmi does not have the power to change her situation—until Ali and 
Yolanda enter the picture. Emmi marries Ali and claims the right to ex-
clude Yolanda. Although a domestic worker, Emmi accedes to the status 
of major character, while Yolanda remains a functional minor character. 
The latter is excluded from conversations on unionization and from the 
social world of female gossip. This is apparently a “cultural exclusion,” but 
a profitable one nonetheless. Emmi’s class identity as conferred by the 
domestic division of labor in the film’s initial situation is displaced by a 
new class status, conferred by an international and European division of 
labor. Simply by virtue of having Yolanda and Ali around, Emmi moves 
up in the world. Having known exclusion and abjection, Emmi not only 
acquires a trophy Moroccan husband, but finds herself in a position to 
capitalize on her German citizenship on the European stage, claiming 
superiority over Yolanda. Emmi is still working class, but now Yolanda is 
below her. The latter has just joined the ranks of an emerging migrant 
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Figs. 1, 2. Frames from Rainer Werner Fassbinder (Dir.), Ali, Fear Eats the Soul (1974).
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subproletariat. The transformation in class identity is not presented by 
the film as an implacable fact. Fassbinder’s film makes sure its viewer 
sees the German cleaning ladies actively exploiting the situation. If 
Yolanda is being paid less, they are likely to get the raise they want. Far 
from being threatened by Yolanda’s presence, as the alternative scenario 
would have it, the German cleaning ladies understand swiftly that part 
of the surplus value extracted from the labor of underpaid immigrants 
translates into benefits for German citizens.9 
Most viewers of Fassbinder’s Ali do not notice Yolanda—a confirma-
tion of her minor status. She does not say anything in the film, except 
to timidly suggest that she is not from Yugoslavia, but rather from 
Herzegovina, a detail that remains without consequence. She is from 
somewhere in Eastern Europe. She is, as Alex Woloch would put it, a 
flat character, reduced to one memorable use within the narrative and 
necessarily denied actualization as a round, full-fledged human being.10
Yolanda is played by Helga Ballhaus, the wife of the film’s cinematogra-
pher, Michael Ballhaus. Yolanda’s role is so minor that Fassbinder did 
not even credit Helga Ballhaus (he did not credit himself either, for his 
role as Emmi’s racist son-in-law). She is an extra, the cameraman’s invis-
ible wife. In retrospect, however, having paused the scenes of Yolanda’s 
quiet appearance and disappearance, it becomes clear that she is most 
necessary to the film’s narrative universe. While Ali is racialized as non-
European, Yolanda is racialized as Eastern European. 
The film brings together the two figures of European otherness, one 
coming from outside Europe, the other from within. We know how to 
read Ali’s racialization—he is Moroccan, but is referred to as a “Negro.” 
It is not ethnicity that is at work here, as many insist in the European 
debate, but racialization. We are still learning, however, to discern the 
process through which Yolanda is racialized. We know we are witnessing 
a process of racialization in her case, too, because the German cleaning 
ladies cannot name Yolanda’s ethnicity, and neither Yugoslavia nor East-
ern Europe are ethnicities. Yolanda is certainly not a “Negro,” she can in 
fact pass for white (she is played by a German actress), but it is clear that 
she is not-quite-white in the eyes of the German women. In nineteenth 
century racial typologies that assign Ali the caption “Negro,” she would 
have been a “Slav.” Not knowing how to name her, her coworkers do not 
give Yolanda a racialized caption. But their exclusionary silence is thick 
with meaning. Given the fact that at this time the debate on immigration 
begins to be imbued with racial meaning and that Yolanda, like Ali, is 
no doubt considered an immigrant, the German women establish their 
racialized distance from her.11 
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Ali was extraordinarily insightful in its diagnosis of the culture of 
everyday fascism and its racializing practices in 1970s Germany. Despite 
Fassbinder’s objection that “they should find another word beside ‘fas-
cism,’” the phrase “everyday fascism” retains its eloquence, drawing at-
tention to habitual gestures of exclusion that are difficult to exorcise.12
Fassbinder anticipated that, in the last decades of the twentieth century 
and the turn into the twenty-first, the critical debate would become tied 
to questions of migration and immigration. The paradigmatic gesture of 
everyday fascism in Fassbinder’s film, reminiscent of Franz Kafka’s The 
Castle, is the stare. Fassbinder invented an oppressive, heavy, obdurate, 
fixing cinematic stare. In the rhythm of his film, he cyclically stages 
such a stare and then freezes it into a tableau, allowing the viewer to 
study it. The viewer thus comes to occupy a difficult position: staring 
alongside the characters in the film and at the same time noting and 
studying the stare he or she is forced to perform.13 Exemplary is the 
haunting image of Emmi’s neighbor, Frau Kargus, watching Emmi and 
Ali leave for work after their first night together (fig. 3). Fassbinder’s 
film is a critical, theoretical document, in that it shows the neighbor’s 
stare to be individual and collective at the same time. Since Frau Kargus 
is watching, “everyone” is watching, including the viewer.
If in the 1970s the film hit a historical nerve in terms of Ali’s situa-
tion, today it does so vis-à-vis both Ali and Yolanda. Yolanda becomes 
noticeable in Fassbinder’s film because she anticipates a large number 
of Eastern European female characters in recent European cinema.14
She stands out in the group of cleaning ladies in Fassbinder’s film, too. 
She is young, blonde, tall, and slender; in other words, conventionally 
attractive. Somewhat incongruously in the context of her cleaning job, 
she wears a pair of red, high-heel shoes. Yolanda is and is not abject. 
Likewise, the racialization of contemporary migrant Eastern European 
women needs to be understood relationally and situationally.15 Today 
the new Yolandas might still be cleaning houses (cleaning remains the 
lowest ladder of racialized occupational hierarchies), but they might also 
be working in other sectors of the European niche of the global “care 
industry,” as nurses, nannies, or sex workers. Following the exultant 
handover of Eastern Europe to neoliberalism in the post-1989 decades, 
the European division of labor has assigned these jobs (traditionally 
conceived of as “women’s work”) to both non-European and Eastern 
European women. Reading Fassbinder’s film today, Yolanda’s presence 
comes across as uncanny; she is “ahead of her time.” 
Responding to worries about the death of cinema in the age of the 
digital, Laura Mulvey argues that digital media provide us with new 
critical possibilities that effectively democratize the position of the critic. 
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Allowing us to still, delay, and forward the image, digital technologies 
interrupt spectatorial narrative desire and transform us into pensive 
spectators.16 The cinematic text can become once again a series of 
photograms we can read, slowly and patiently. Fassbinder stilled his 
images of everyday fascism into tableaux, inviting such a reading. The 
new technologies further extend the temporality of these tableaux. We 
can now linger indefinitely on scenes in various films in the history of 
cinema, noticing “details” we might have missed as hurried spectators in 
a movie theater during a film festival in the 1970s. These technologies 
allow us, for example, to detach ourselves from the fascinating romance 
between Ali and Emmi and zoom in on an uncredited character’s red 
shoes—the identifying sign of an otherwise minor, flat character. In the 
digital age, this minor character makes demands on viewers’ attention in 
ways she did not on Fassbinder’s contemporaries. Yolanda is a character 
in a 1973 film and a contemporary figure at the same time. 
In his study of minor characters, Alex Woloch proposes that “narra-
tive meaning takes shape in the dynamic flux of attention and neglect 
toward the various characters who are locked within the same story but 
have radically different positions within the narrative.”17 A reading of 
Fassbinder’s Yolanda suggests that a minor character’s position within 
a narrative can shift over time, in relation to new audiences, who have 
access to new technologies of viewing and reading. This shift results in 
the redistribution of attention and neglect vis-à-vis major and minor 
characters. Today the much-neglected Yolanda compels the viewer’s at-
tention—not as if she were a major character, but because her minorness, 
Fig. 3. Frame from Rainer Werner Fassbinder (Dir.), Ali, Fear Eats the Soul (1974).
735old europe, new europe, eastern europe
the occlusion of her “case,” becomes readable. If the domestic worker is 
the paradigmatic minor character, with narrative neglect paralleling the 
social and political neglect of her labor, the narrative redistribution of 
attention toward Yolanda calls the contemporary viewer to ponder the 
nature of her work. As Woloch writes, “minor characters are the proletariat 
of the novel.”18 Yolanda represents the subproletariat of cinema. 
The Traffic in Eastern European Women
In 1973, Fassbinder’s film drove home a message about the centrality 
of gender and sexuality to any analysis of labor and migration. Perhaps 
without knowing it, it also taught its audiences something important 
about the traffic in Eastern European women. It did so, in an apparent 
paradox, by dramatizing a case of traffic in men. 
No other scene in Ali is more pivotal to the film’s project than that in 
which Emmi’s coworkers visit her at home and are introduced to Ali. Let 
us briefly revisit the scene: The women, prompted by an overly patron-
izing Emmi, surround Ali and start touching him (fig. 4). They check 
his muscles and evaluate the smoothness of his skin. They are surprised 
he is clean and proceed to discuss his hygiene (Emmi assures them 
he showers daily). In this scene, Ali is circulated between the German 
women. Although Ali is very masculine and the film lingers admiringly 
on his strong body for minutes on end, the scene effectively feminizes 
him. As Kaja Silverman puts it, drawing on a feminist conversation associ-
ated with the names of Gayle Rubin and Luce Irigaray, Ali is “taken to 
market” by the group of German women.19 He is an object of exchange, 
while the German women, who otherwise find themselves at the most 
abject pole of their culture, are for once in the position of exchangers. 
Add to this the not quite extradiegetic fact of Ali being played by El 
Hedi ben Salem, a Moroccan Gastarbeiter and in 1973 Fassbinder’s lover, 
and the trafficking structure becomes ever more complex. Ali is taken 
to market by the German women on the screen, the filmmaker, as well 
as a viewer fascinated by his sexual versatility. 
I revisit this famous scene because Fassbinder productively frames 
the ambiguity of Ali’s position. He is both an overly virile man and, in 
the second part of the film, a quasi wife. When Emmi fantasizes about 
the possibility of happiness with Ali, she necessarily dreams about going 
away, far from the reach of her neighbors’ ubiquitous stare. Fassbinder 
does not particularize this elsewhere, but upon their return from a 
trip Emmi and Ali are transformed. The trafficking scene above is 
now possible. Ali has become a wife, whom Emmi openly and publicly 
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patronizes. Once Ali is thus feminized, Emmi’s community can accept 
him, especially since they also need him. But if Ali is objectified by the 
women who circle around him and touch him, he also uses his sexuality 
actively. When, after this scene, Ali attempts to escape Emmi’s humilia-
tion, he finds refuge in another German woman’s bed. Although earlier 
in the film the latter had announced her ownership of Ali (“By the way, 
this bar [read: this man] belongs to me”), it is clear that Ali is not her 
possession. He actively and knowingly trades sex for refuge.20 It is the 
ambiguity surrounding a case of traffic in men that makes Ali a produc-
tive entry point into the traffic in women. Contemporary Yolandas very 
much inhabit this agentive ambiguity. 
Today one begins a conversation on the traffic in women by acknowl-
edging that a man can occupy the structural position of the trafficked 
woman and that women can exchange men. At the same time, Yolanda 
prompts us to ask if it still matters whether the sexualized object of traffic 
is in fact a woman. This essay answers this question in the affirmative. 
While both women and men can be theoretically trafficked through 
the structure we call “the traffic in women,” we still need to unpack the 
coincidence of “women” with women. Today, Yolanda occupies Ali’s po-
sition (fig. 4), in various European scenes—whether as a transnational 
wife, a nanny, a nurse, a domestic worker, or a sex worker. 
The productive ambiguity at the heart of the sexual politics of migra-
tion dramatized by Fassbinder’s film remains in force in the contemporary 
European context. The new Yolandas are put into circulation within the 
Fig. 4. Frame from Rainer Werner Fassbinder (Dir.), Ali, Fear Eats the Soul (1974).
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broad economic continuum of “women’s work” and are at the same time 
entrepreneurial, active agents. They are sexualized and use their sexuality. 
They are exploited economically and, in a transnational framework, are 
often upwardly mobile.21 They often displace masculinities “back home,” 
participating in the creation of new forms of masculine precarity.22 These 
are contradictions that make the fabric of the contemporary world of 
migration and its attendant sexual politics. We know this is the pattern 
of Filipina or Sri Lankan women’s migration to Europe. So far we have 
paid little comparative attention to Eastern European women’s mobil-
ity. A comparative analysis is instructive, among other things, because it 
sheds new light on “immigration.” Since the term refers to non-European 
and Eastern European mobilities alike, it is clear that it does not name 
the perils of settlement into a country other than one’s “own.” Rather, 
it covers over a contemporary modality of subproletarian transnational 
labor, which draws on all available resources. To be an “immigrant” is 
to be a certain kind of worker. 
It is not that there are no more Alis in Germany and in Europe. The 
“Old Europe” of male migrant workers is still there. The predicament 
of interracial marriage dramatized by Fassbinder has recently resurfaced 
in France.23 But if we are to understand the world of contemporary 
migration and its sexual politics in the larger European context, I 
believe today we need to focus on the new Yolandas. It is unlikely that 
Fassbinder thought of Yolanda as a “guest worker” in 1973, because 
the Federal Republic’s labor program focused on the recruitment of a 
male workforce. Given that in the last few decades Western European 
economies have entered a “post-Fordist” phase, with limited need for 
muscular male workers, the latter are no longer the paradigmatic “guests” 
in Europe. The care industry is the underside of European post-Fordism; 
its demand is for a female workforce.24 The phenomenon we have come 
to call “the feminization of migration,” effectively a symbolic traffic in 
women, challenges us to focus on a new migrant figure, the woman 
working in various sectors of the care industry. Today, she often “comes 
from” Eastern Europe.
It remains important to remember that migration is Janus-faced, 
emigration and immigration at the same time. On the emigration side, 
one leaves a place that, for one reason or another, has become unliv-
able. When it comes to immigration, one is in search of the Aristotelian 
“good life,” which has been globalized as a normative, consumer-oriented 
Western life. The affect of emigration cycles around feeling stuck, help-
less, and often depressive. The affect of immigration is structured by an 
entrepreneurial optimism shaped by a transnational upward mobility nar-
rative. This is often “cruel optimism,” in Lauren Berlant’s vocabulary, its 
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cruelty a function of, as Berlant writes, “the affective attachment to what 
we call ‘the good life,’ which is for so many a bad life that wears out the 
subjects who nonetheless, and at the same time, find their conditions of 
possibility within it.”25 If, as Berlant argues, in various national contexts 
in the Western world attachments to what used to be fantasied as “the 
good life” are being slowly abandoned, in a global and trans-European 
context the Western good life still looks exciting.26 Eastern European 
Yolandas develop a range of affective attachments to it, in response to 
what Berlant calls the “charisma of the normative.”27 But the search 
for the good life retains its cruel dimensions, given that, among other 
things, it is filtered through the international and European sexual 
division of labor.28 
Habermas and Europe
What does our reading of Fassbinder’s film and Yolanda’s place in 
it tell us about Europe and Eastern Europe in particular? The answer 
to this question has to pass through an assessment of how Yolanda’s 
Eastern Europeanness signifies today. What does it mean to be Eastern 
European in today’s Europe? In order to begin to answer this question, I 
will read closely two texts that I believe are symptomatic of the European 
debate among literary and cultural critics. They have also helped shape 
the meaning of Eastern Europeanness in the last two decades, if only 
obliquely. One is signed by Habermas and Derrida; the other by Derrida. 
In February 2003, Habermas and Derrida cosigned a letter (which 
Habermas alone wrote) in response to the American invasion of Iraq. 
The letter was titled, “February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A 
Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe.”29
Habermas used the opportunity to express his hope that February 15, 
2003, the day of mass antiwar demonstrations in major Western Euro-
pean capitals (and around the world), could be seen as a sign of “the 
birth of a European public sphere” (F 291). Coming together around 
a social and political project anchored in principles inherited from the 
European Enlightenment, Europeans reach a point where, in Habermas’s 
words, “citizens of one nation must regard the citizens of another nation 
as fundamentally ‘one of us’” (F 293). Importantly, Habermas’s appeal 
was for a Europe beyond Eurocentrism. This Europe would nonetheless 
remain anchored in something Habermas calls “core Europe.” 
The “European identity” Habermas called for in 2003 was articulated 
primarily against an American other (metonymically represented by 
George W. Bush), but also against disruptive Eastern European others.30
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Habermas’s explanation for these latter countries’ support of the Iraq 
war was that “while certainly working hard for their admission into the 
EU, [they] are nevertheless not yet ready to place limits on the sover-
eignty that they have so recently gained” (F 292). Anticipating under-
standable reactions to the titular emphasis on “core Europe,” Habermas 
tried to reassure his readers that, “Taking a leading role does not mean 
excluding. The avant-gardist core of Europe must not wall itself into a 
new small Europe. It must—as it has so often—be the locomotive” (F 
292). One of the postwar rationales for the formation of the European 
Union has been the restoration of European “influence” in the world. 
Faced with the war in Iraq and American triumphalist disregard for 
the international community, Habermas wished Europe would reclaim 
its influence. His article appeared in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
under the headline “Our Renewal. After the War: The Rebirth of Eu-
rope.”31 The underlying claim is that Europeans have had a chance to 
learn the lessons of history, especially the Holocaust, and, on account 
of their purifying mea culpa, can now assume a new leading role in the 
world.32 As Habermas put it in a different context, Europe must “pull 
itself together and play its appointed civilizing role.”33 How can one not 
be skeptical of such statements? 
While Habermas’s intention to intervene in the urgency of the politi-
cal moment is laudable (see also Derrida’s signature), it is difficult to 
imagine a European public sphere birthed in this 2003 document. The 
spectacle of the public sphere orchestrated by Habermas on this occasion, 
the concomitant publication of a number of articles on Europe signed 
by his friends and collaborators (Umberto Eco, Adolf Muschg, Gianni 
Vattimo, Richard Rorty, Fernando Savater), did not include any Eastern 
European intellectuals, not to mention any women.34 Adam Krzemiński 
saw in the gesture a “deliberate non-invitation.”35 Habermas dismissed 
such objections as unproductive sensitivities.36 He subsequently returned 
to his formulations to propose that a European policy of gradual inte-
gration assumes that Eastern European countries can “align themselves 
with the center . . . have the option of joining the center at any time.”37
In technical terms, given the assumption that, as Adolf Muschg put it, 
“the clocks of the liberated countries were set to different times,” this is a 
variation on the “two velocities” theory, whereby the more economically 
advanced countries of the EU lead the way toward European prosperity.38
In cultural terms, the rhetoric of social evolutionism cannot but bring 
to mind familiar images of the colonial avant-garde and its attendant 
“catching up” motif. 
Habermas returned to these ideas in the context of the current eco-
nomic crisis in the Eurozone, which is thought to be threatening the 
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existence of the EU. He pleaded once again for “more Europe,” in a 
laudable effort to produce a “democratically legalized EU” as an alter-
native to a EU anchored in the common currency. Habermas’s views 
on the Old/New Europe distinction (where, pace former US Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Old Europe stands for a Western Europe 
united around the French/German partnership and New Europe for 
Eastern Europe) returned in this context: “Political integration based 
on social well-being is necessary to protect the national plurality and 
cultural wealth of the ‘Old Europe’ biotope from the increasing stan-
dardisation implied by globalisation.”39 Old Europe is proposed as an 
alternative to globalization, but lurking behind Habermas’s formulation 
are concerns about Eastern Europe, from which Old Europe also needs 
to be protected. Old Europe seems to face two threats: globalization 
and New/Eastern Europe. Note Habermas’s use of the word “biotope” 
here, which the OED defines as “an environmentally uniform region 
or habitat, occupied by a particular biological community.”40 Somehow 
the “cultural wealth and national plurality” of Old Europe, imagined as 
an alternative to the homogenizing effects of globalization, returns us 
to a biological community. Why do I imagine Habermas brushing this 
last point aside as mere literary sensitivity? 
What cannot be brushed aside is the fact that Habermas is nostalgic 
for a pre-1989 Western Europe. This was, in his words, a “fortunate 
historical constellation” (F 294). Nostalgia, however, risks returning us 
to the Cold War, when European solidarity meant solidarity against the 
Eastern threat. This is how one can explain the fact that, as Krzemiński 
put it, “there is obviously no feeling of joy within ‘core Europe’ over 
the EU’s eastward expansion.”41 1989 was a moment of joy throughout 
Eastern Europe. Exuberant images of the fall of the Berlin Wall met-
onymically captured the spirit of the moment. Grudgingly anticipating 
the EU “enlargement,” few Western Europeans felt solidary in this 
joy.42 It is no surprise that Habermas, a fervent advocate of European 
solidarity, does not seem to entertain the possibility of, say, German/
Bulgarian solidarity. Having lauded German solidarity in the context of 
German reunification, Habermas believes that a “thin” solidarity is suf-
ficient for European unification.43 Such solidarity, if it can be called that, 
remains at the level of what in EU parlance is called “cohesion”—help 
for “structural adjustment.”44 In the debates surrounding the current 
economic crisis, Europe seems to have become synonymous with the 
Eurozone, such that even those Eastern European countries which are 
members of the EU but are not in the Eurozone are falling off the map 
of European solidarity.
741old europe, new europe, eastern europe
The problem with Habermas’s vision of Europe is that the two veloci-
ties theory translates into a European division of labor. As an effect of 
EU immigration and labor regulations, Eastern European “immigrants” 
do a range of temporary, underpaid jobs in Western Europe. This is a 
sexual division of labor, because the European subproletarian labor 
market is profoundly gendered. Eastern European women, alongside 
women from the global South, engage in “women’s work,” especially 
in the care industry. In today’s Europe, Yolanda is cleaning houses or 
pushing strollers and wheelchairs, while her country is struggling to 
“catch up” and “align” itself with the center of Europe. This is the point 
where Fassbinder’s insights in Ali impose themselves. Habermas’s exclu-
sion of any consideration of Yolanda in his musings on Europe repeats, 
structurally, her exclusion by the German cleaning ladies. Habermas’s 
calls for solidarity notwithstanding, Yolanda is still eating her lunch 
alone. Fassbinder’s film has taught us that this is a productive exclusion. 
Someone, somewhere, must be getting a raise. 
Derrida and Europe
In what sense did Derrida sign Habermas’s letter in 2003? Did he sub-
scribe to it? Did he countersign its rhetoric? What of the manufactured 
event that occasioned it? Did he endorse its Old Europe/New Europe 
distinctions? When it comes to Derrida’s Europe, beyond this 2003 sig-
nature, I prefer to recall Derrida’s “The Other Heading.”45 The essay 
was written as a talk for a colloquium on “European Cultural Identity,” 
Turin, May 1990. It was published in French in 1991 and translated 
into English in 1992. In other words, it is situated between 1989 and 
Maastricht. One of Derrida’s tasks was to conceptualize this “today” and 
imagine its aftermath. I will revisit Derrida’s argument here, in an ef-
fort to offer it as a counterpoint to the Habermas/Derrida 2003 letter. 
Derrida’s “The Other Heading” explored the feeling that 1989 was a 
European moment. History seemed to be open, undecided. The word 
“revolution” was in the air. There was a sense that 1989 could supersede 
a much-celebrated 1968 as the Europeans’ historical horizon. And yet 
the undecidability of history sheltered ambivalence. Derrida wrote: “We 
ask ourselves in hope, fear and trembling, what this face [of Europe] is 
going to resemble? . . . Will it resemble the face of some persona whom 
we believe we know: Europe? And if its non-resemblance bears the traits 
of the future, will it escape monstrosity?”46 Potential monstrosity, Der-
rida intuited in anticipation of Fortress Europe, is first and foremost 
a question of borders. Was it possible to create an open Europe, when 
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the very “question of Europe” seems to be necessarily one of borders?47
Against the anticipation of the Fortress Europe monster, Derrida 
pleaded for openness: “An opening and a non-exclusion for which 
Europe would be in some way responsible? For which Europe would 
be, in a constitutive way, this very responsibility?” (OH 17). In Derrida’s 
formulations, Europe seems to remain a question of headings, of who 
gets to lead, to be in the center or core of Europe. Except that, unlike 
Habermas, Derrida retreated from Europe’s avant-gardist mission, in 
order to imagine a Europe that can be the very possibility of change. To 
begin with, Derrida suggested, as if in passing, the ship could, possibly, 
change captains and, Derrida added, “why not?—the age or sex of the 
captain” (OH 15). Retrospectively, Derrida’s passing remark acquires 
renewed force. Without such a change in heading, the all-too-palpable 
risk is that European “unification” becomes the farcical repetition of 
German unification, effectively an economic and cultural takeover. It 
should come as no surprise that Habermas functioned as a spokesman 
for both. 
In order to keep Europe open to its myriad others, Derrida proposed 
we move beyond the familiar European heading that is always already 
modern, progressive, and “diverse.” Derrida’s language in 1991 almost 
seems to be mocking Habermas’s 2003 letter, avant la lettre: “all the 
nation states of the planet preparing themselves to join us at the head 
of the pack, right at the forefront [cap], at the capital point [pointe] of 
advanced democracies, there where capital is on the cutting edge of 
progress [à la pointe du progrès]” (OH 33). When it comes to Europe, 
instead of “alignment,” Derrida advocated the duty of welcoming others 
“in order not only to integrate them but to recognize and accept their 
alterity” (OH 77). Twenty years later, we might repeat the question: 
What would Europe be if its mission were not to “integrate” through 
“enlargement,” but to recognize, accept, and cultivate Eastern European 
alterities? What relation would this Europe have to the rest of the world? 
In 1990, Derrida resisted (again, avant la lettre) what would become 
the call concentrated in the phrase “provincializing Europe”: “It [Euro-
pean cultural identity] cannot and must not be dispersed into a myriad 
of provinces” (OH 39). The problem with provinces is that they are “a 
multiplicity of self-enclosed idioms or petty little nationalisms, each 
one jealous and untranslatable” (OH 39). People from the provinces 
might take issue with the qualification of “province” as self-enclosed, 
jealous, untranslatable, and nationalist. The point of comparison is the 
cosmopolitan metropolis: “It [European cultural identity] cannot and 
must not renounce places of great circulation or heavy traffic, the great 
avenues or thoroughfares of translation and communication, and thus, 
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of mediatization” (OH 39). Derrida believed that the ongoing traffic in 
the metropolis should follow its course, without solidifying into a “capi-
tal.” One hears Derrida the Parisian here. Does one renounce the great 
places of European culture? At what risk? At what risk does one not? 
Those untranslatable provinces, which today have gone trans-European 
(with Eastern Europe itself being figured as a European province), are 
also cultural provinces. They have often found refuge in myriad national-
isms in response to their provincialization by the capital. The “jealousy” 
of the European province is an affect in need of critical elaboration. 
Derrida’s predictable move is his insistence that one must inhabit the 
aporia, the unresolved tension between the celebration of “places of great 
circulation and heavy traffic” and the need to vigilantly limit their ambi-
tion to become “capitals of [European] culture.” The problem is that, 
in retrospect, it becomes apparent that the same places of heavy traffic 
continue to “cap” the heading, especially the European heading. Read-
ing Derrida, Gayatri Spivak cautions against the invocation of “aporias 
innocent of the discourse of political economy.”48 Inhabiting the ethical 
horizon of Derrida’s aporia requires that we engage the conundrums 
of European political economy and account for the international and 
European division of labor and Yolanda’s place in their care industries.49
Derrida’s “The Other Heading” is very much avant la lettre in that Der-
rida, unlike Habermas, the theorist of the public sphere, foregrounded 
the limits of the conversation itself: “present here at this table are mostly 
men and citizens of Western Europe, writers or philosophers according 
to a classic model of the European intellectual: a guardian held respon-
sible for memory and culture, a citizen entrusted with a sort of spiritual 
mission of Europe” (OH 22–23). This was May 1990. One wonders why 
there were no participants from the newly “liberated” would-be European 
countries at the table convened by Gianni Vattimo. Derrida mentioned 
the “techno-scientific and techno-economic givens,” which “affect, among 
other things, the production, transmission, structure, and effects of the 
very discourses in which one tries to formalize this problematic” (OH 38). 
What are the techno-scientific and techno-economic “givens” [données] 
that determines participation at the European table? Is the gender of 
the participants, for example, such a given? Is citizenship? The ques-
tions concern the table in Turin in 1990, but also the imagined table 
of Habermas’s 2003 “European public sphere.” This table is produced 
as the table it is. What appear as its “givens” are naturalized effects of 
European political economy and culture. One imagines Yolanda quietly 
lurking around the table, serving coffee or sweeping the floors, while 
“European intellectuals” debate the spirit and future of Europe. 
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Conclusion
In 2002, German-Iranian film director Shahbaz Noshir made a thirteen-
minute short film titled Angst isst Seele auf—an homage to Fassbinder. 
Fassbinder’s 1973 title had been Angst essen Seele auf. The verb essen was 
used incorrectly. An article was omitted before Seele. The grammatical 
“mistakes” signaled Ali’s accented German. Noshir’s title returns the 
verb essen to its standard third person singular form but still omits the 
article, inviting the viewer to speculate that perhaps standard German 
remains an ideal for Noshir’s character, the new Ali. Noshir’s camera is 
positioned in such a way that it sees through the eyes of a young actor, 
Mulu (played by black German actor Pierre Sanoussi-Bliss). Occasionally, 
his hands emerge from behind the camera, a confirmation that he is not 
holding a camera, but rather is it. Otherwise, the viewer cannot see Mulu 
for the duration of the film; he or she can only hear his off-screen voice. 
Noshir’s film follows a scenario based on a real event, in which a black 
actor is harassed by a group of neo-Nazis on his way to work. Noshir 
makes use of Fassbinder’s signature stare, as the passersby witnessing the 
scene of everyday fascism stare in extended duration without intervening. 
One woman lights a cigarette as she looks down at the fallen man. Even 
more disturbing is the image of an undisturbed girl who seems to have 
been socialized into the dynamics of the stare at a young age. Arrested 
by the police, Mulu explains that he is in a hurry, because he has been 
cast in the role of Ali in a theater production of Angst essen Seele auf. The 
policeman, a regular theatergoer suspicious of avant-garde productions, 
has not heard of Fassbinder’s film, but dutifully corrects the black man’s 
use of the verb essen: “As a native German, you should know that.” 
Having followed Mulu as he arrives at the theater late, the viewer 
revisits the first scene of Fassbinder’s Ali. Fassbinder’s film is thoroughly 
theatrical, having borrowed some of its distanciation techniques from 
the world of Brechtian theater. Foregrounding the film’s theatricality, 
Noshir puts Ali and Emmi onstage. In the last scene in Noshir’s short, 
Ali/Mulu and Emmi are sitting at an austere table in the middle of 
the stage, facing the audience in a small theater. Ali is played by Mulu, 
who remains invisible to the viewer, while Emmi is played by an ever-
older Brigitte Mira, her intricate facial expression rendered even more 
eloquent by the passage of time. They are replaying the first scene of 
Fassbinder’s film, in which Emmi and Ali meet in the Asphalt Pub. As 
the two dance, Ali/Mulu tells Emmi about his situation at work: “German 
master, Arab dog.” Emmi gestures a protest, but Ali/Mulu insists that it 
is not good to think about it too much: “Think much, cry much.” It is 
the line that has defined Ali as a docile immigrant figure. It is clear that 
745old europe, new europe, eastern europe
Mulu, whom the viewer has just seen respond to neo-Nazi violence by 
saying “I am Germany,” does not subscribe to Ali’s philosophy of “better 
not think too much.” Linguistic competence is paramount to this shift 
in attitude. As it turns out, Mulu speaks standard German, while the 
neo-Nazi who attacks him (played by German actor Selim Dursun) has 
a slight, stylized accent. Noshir’s film thus enters a provocative dialogue 
with the contemporary viewer of Fassbinder’s film. It prompts the viewer 
to revisit Ali and be reminded that, in Fassbinder’s film, the still-not-
standard sentence Angst isst Seele auf is spoken by Emmi. In Noshir’s 
short, it is spoken by the policeman. How to make the viewer aware of 
the fact that he or she remains eager to attribute the nonstandard use 
of German to Mulu is something Noshir learned from Fassbinder. In 
another gesture of homage to Fassbinder, Noshir assigns the role of the 
bystanders in Fassbinder’s bar scene to the staring theater spectator, a 
stand-in for the film’s viewer. 
Aside from the question of the viewer’s complicity with the structures 
of everyday fascism, the dance scene in Noshir’s short reveals that, forty 
years later, Emmi is still longing for touch. The short ends with a black 
hand reaching from behind the camera to caress her face (fig. 5). 
One is reminded of Ali’s memorable first touch of Emmi’s hand. The 
two tableaux make touch visible as the paradigmatic gesture of care, 
including eroticized care provided by black hands. Although Yolanda 
does not make it into Noshir’s contemporary rewriting of Ali and has 
not captured the distributive attention of critics who participate in the 
critical debate on migration and racialization practices in contemporary 
Europe, this essay has argued that today her heirs are often underpaid 
to do this caring work. I tried to render her invisibility-cum-flatness 
eloquent—in Fassbinder’s film and on the margins of two influential 
cultural texts. Today Yolanda is part of the semantic field of the inscrip-
tion Angst essen Seele auf—to be found on T-shirts worn by disenchanted 
youth across Europe. 
If we are to think about modalities of touch, Noshir’s dance scene 
also functions as a reminder that at the end of Ali Emmi and Ali dance 
once again. “Together we are strong,” Emmi tells Ali. It is, arguably, a 
call for solidarity, anchored in a gesture. Let us dance together—the 
local working class and the migrant subproletarian class. The dance is 
clumsy, strained, hardly elegant. It requires work. Although the relation 
between Emmi and Ali still needs our attention, I will offer as a conclu-
sion my wager that our task today is to imagine a postcolonial alliance 
between Ali and Yolanda. The two never met in Fassbinder’s film, but 
they certainly meet in more recent films. Their relationship is even less 
natural than that between Emmi and Ali. Their dance is even more dif-
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ficult, tense, awkward. Various moves in this new dance have nonethe-
less become visible in the last few years, pointing to the possibility of 
imagining Europe beyond the “Old Europe biotope.” 
Washington University in St. Louis
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